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АННОТАЦИЯ
Растущее число финансовых учреждений, не способных привлечь необходимое количество акционерного 
капитала, вынуждены привлекать средства через инструменты мезонинного финансирования. Если данные 
трудности продолжатся, то роль гибридных ценных бумаг может стать более существенной, так как их можно 
будет рассматривать в качестве замены обычным акциям в целях контрциклического буфера капитала, удов-
летворению дополнительных требований увеличения капитала и т.д. Таким образом, важность мезонинного 
финансирования как для банковского сектора, так и прочих отраслей экономики очевидна и имеет потенциал 
для дальнейшего роста, однако нормативные аспекты и риски новых инструментов остаются до конца не ис-
следованными. С этим связан интерес к такому методу финансирования участников российского финансового 
рынка, а задача обеспечения приемлемости уровня риска, передаваемого инвестору при структурировании 
мезонинного финансирования, в условиях кризиса приобретает особую остроту. В статье автор анализирует 
ключевые аспекты Базельских соглашений в отношении регулирования инструментов мезонинного финанси-
рования, методологию рейтинговых агентств по оценке гибридных ценных бумаг и изучает влияние механиз-
ма конвертации на уровень риска гибридных ценных бумаг.
Ключевые слова: мезонинное финансирование; гибридные ценные бумаги; конвертируемые облигации; инве-
стиции; финансовые инструменты.
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ABSTRACT
A growing number of fi nancial institutions are unable to raise the required amount of equity and have to raise 
their own funds by means of public mezzanine. If these problems continue, the role of hybrids may become more 
signifi cant, as they may be considered as a replacement of common equity for the purpose of counter-cyclical 
buffers, capital surcharges and so on. Thus, the importance of mezzanine capital for the fi nancial system is already 
established and has a potential for further growth, while regulatory aspects and risk assessment of these relatively 
new instruments remain unsolved. In the article, the author analyses key regulatory concerns of Basel Accords in 
regards to mezzanine instruments, assesses the methodology of rating agencies to evaluate the risks incorporated 
in hybrid securities and compares the risk profi les of traditional convertible and recently developed contingent 
convertible bonds. The results articulate that measures applied by both Basel Committee members and rating 
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agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, etc.) are not suffi cient to manage risks incorporated in hybrid securities. The latter may 
contribute to the growth of fi nancial failures we have observed in recent years.
Keywords: mezzanine fi nancing; mezzanine debt; hybrid securities; contingent convertibles; investment; fi nancial 
instruments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mezzanine is a type of fi nancing that has charac-
teristics of both debt and equity. It has recently be-
came an important part of the banks’ regulated capi-
tal, while corporations are still free from regulatory 
constraints in deciding about their capital structures. 
Mezzanine is attractive to corporations because it of-
fers flexibility without diluting equity capital — a 
cost-effective alternative to issuing equity since inter-
est payments are generally tax deductible and divi-
dends are not.
Given the deviant evolution of mezzanine fi nanc-
ing instruments in the world, they have their own 
characteristics in the US, Europe, Asia [1] and, of 
course, in Russia. In the West, where capital markets 
are more developed, mezzanine instruments emerged 
as a kind of publicly traded bonds, and further their 
development has been followed by mezzanine loan. 
On the other hand, in Russia, where bank lending 
plays an increasingly important role in corporate fi -
nancing, from all forms of mezzanine fi nancing cur-
rently is commonly practiced only mezzanine lend-
ing. Thus, in general, mezzanine financing instru-
ments can be classifi ed as private and publicly traded 
(Vasilescu and Popa, 2006; European Commission, 
2007) [10, 15]. Private instruments are subordinated 
and unsecured loans, loans with “silent participa-
tion”, etc. Publicly traded instruments are option and 
perpetual bonds, contingent convertibles, preferred 
equity, i.e. — more often classifi ed as hybrid securi-
ties (Figure 1). Where exactly they are located in the 
debt — equity spectrum is determined by their subor-
dination, loss absorption, coupon deferral, perpetual 
nature (effective maturity date), conversion and ad-
ditional investor protection. Generally, the equity-like 
characteristics allow hybrids to be loss absorbing and 
thus qualify as regulatory capital.
Hybrid instruments are experiencing rapid growth, 
driven by a market necessity to introduce equity-like 
instruments that will act as loss absorbers instead of 
common equity [3]. If there were no problems with 
raising common equity, these securities would not 
play such a signifi cant role in Basel Capital Accords. 
A growing number of fi nancial institutions are unable 
to raise the required amount of equity and have to 
raise their own funds by means of public mezzanine. 
If these problems continue, the role of hybrids may 
become more signifi cant, as they may be considered 
as a replacement of common equity for the purpose of 
counter-cyclical buffers, capital surcharges and so on. 
Thus, the importance of mezzanine capital for the fi -
nancial system is already established and has a poten-
tial for further growth, while regulatory aspects and 
risk assessment of these relatively new instruments 
remain unsolved.
I I. BASEL I AND BASEL II 
SUPPLEMENTARY CAPITAL
Global regulation of banking activities began with 
introduction of Basel I (or Basel Capital Accord) in 
SENIOR DEBT
Subordinated and unsecured loans
MEZZANINE
“Silent” participation loans
Option and perpetual bonds
HYBRID 
SECURITIES
Contingent Convertibles
Preferred equity
EQUITY
Figure 1. Mezzanine fi nancing instruments
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1988. Basel I has fi xed minimum capital requirements 
against the credit risk. It introduced the concept of 
risk-weighted assets (RWAs), against which banks 
were required to hold at least 8 % of capital.
Risk weighting is a complex system in which 
some assets account less against capital requirements 
than others. Under the Basel system total RWA were 
defi ned as:
 
1
12, ,5
N
i ii
RWA OR MR W A  
where: OR — operational risk; MR — market risk; 
W — an asset risk weight; A — an asset.
The purpose of capital requirements was to pre-
vent internationally active banks from excessive risk 
exposure [15]. By implementing Basel I, banks were 
required to hold regulatory capital of 8 % of their risk-
weighted assets. A risk-weighting scheme was also 
defi ned. Basel I has introduced the concept of Tier 1, 
2 and 3 of capital, where only Tier 1 accounted for the 
classical, strict defi nition of equity. Tier 1 capital (also 
referred to as ‘core capital’) consisted of common eq-
uity, reserves and non-cumulative preferred shares. 
Hybrid securities and subordinated debt instruments 
were eligible for Tier 2 (supplementary capital). 
These instruments have also qualifi ed as ‘mezzanine 
financing’ according to Mantysaari (2010) [6] and 
Liberadzki (2016) [3].
Moreover, the Basel Committee has released The 
Basel II Accord in June 2004 where has clearly artic-
ulated that ‘Upper’ Tier 2 (Upper T2) may consist of 
mezzanine capital instruments — that is, ‘a number 
of capital instruments which combine certain charac-
teristics of equity and certain characteristics of debt. 
(…) where these instruments have close similarities 
to equity, in particular when they are able to sup-
port losses on an on-going basis without triggering 
liquidation, they may be included in supplementary 
capital (…) ’. Certain categories of instruments were 
named as constituting mezzanine or ‘hybrid’ capital: 
perpetual preference shares carrying a cumulative 
fixed charge, long-term preferred shares (Canada), 
titres participatifs and titres subordonnés à durée in-
déterminée (France), Genussscheine (Germany), per-
petual debt instruments (UK) and fi nally US manda-
tory convertible debt instruments (Paragraph 49 [xi] 
of the Basel II Accord). Thus, one may assume that 
Upper T2 capital is to be formed by perpetual subor-
dinated hybrid securities. Qualifying criteria for Up-
per T2 capital also were articulated in Annex 1a of the 
Basel II Accord. The essential requirements for hy-
brid capital securities are: (a) unsecured, subordinated 
and fully paid up; (b) no call option for bondholder or 
no call for issuer except where supervisory authority 
agrees; (c) loss absorbing without bank being obliged 
to cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated 
debt), and fi nally (d) ‘although the capital instrument 
may carry an obligation to pay interest that cannot 
permanently be reduced or waived (unlike dividends 
on ordinary shareholders’ equity), it should allow ser-
vice obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative 
preference shares) where the profi tability of the bank 
would not support payment’.
The last requirement on interest payment distribu-
tion is particularly important. Coupon deferral was al-
lowed only in a situation of fi nancial stress that calls 
into question the bank’s ability to remain profi table. 
Thus, payment distribution on hybrid Upper T2 secu-
rities was left for the decision of the banking institu-
tions. When designing Lower Tier 2 (Lower T2), the 
Basel Committee provided special attention to per-
petual maturity of securities and to their loss-absorb-
ing features. As a result, subordinated debt securities, 
with maturity of over fi ve years at issuance (or fi ve 
years to the first call date) have classified for sup-
plementary capital and became a subject to adequate 
amortization agreements (Paragraph 49 [xii] Basel II 
Accord). The amount of this Lower Tier 2 securities 
was capped at 50 % of the company’ common equity 
items. Lower T2 securities were not designed to ab-
sorb losses, so coupons were paid on a mandatory ba-
sis if the bank had announced an annual profi t.
Basel II also left it to discretion of national regula-
tors if a Tier 3 instruments are to be allowed. The un-
derlying logic of such a short-term subordinated debt 
was to allow a fi nancial institution to meet the capi-
tal requirements for market risk (Paragraph 49 [xiii] 
Basel II Accord). Such securities had to meet certain 
minimal conditions:
(a) be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up, 
(b) have an original maturity of at least 2 years, (c) no 
call except where supervisory authority agrees and (d) 
lock-up clause prohibits any distribution (even repay-
ment on maturity) which would result in breaching 
of minimum capital requirements by the institution 
(Paragraph 49 [xiv] Basel II Accord).
To conclude, the equity-like characteristics al-
lowed hybrid securities to be more loss absorbing and 
qualify as regulatory capital under the Basel I and 
Basel II Capital Accords. However, not all of them 
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can meet the requirements of Additional Tier 1 (Ad-
ditional T1) capital under the more recent, post-crisis, 
Basel III.
I I I. BASEL II I CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Drawbacks of the Basel II capital structure be-
came evident in the fi nancial crisis of 2008–2009.
Apparently, in many banks conventional equity 
amounted only to 1–3 % of RWAs before the fi nancial 
crisis. Therefore, regulators had to strengthen Capital 
Accords. The new Basel III regulation sets a minimum 
of 4.5 % of RWA as core Tier 1 capital. Basel III intro-
duces a 3 % leverage ratio, defi ned as common equity 
to total assets, or more precisely total exposure taking 
into account off-balance sheet derivatives. Most impor-
tant to notice, the Basel II hybrid T2 capital has proven 
by the credit crisis to be not truly loss absorbing. In 
other words, Basel II Tier 2 securities have failed to 
absorb losses. They ranked senior to the Core Tier 1 
securities and were entitled to a fi xed coupon. Coupons 
were discretionary but had to be paid if the bank made 
a profi t or paid any ordinary dividend. Most coupons 
were paid throughout the credit crisis unless there was 
some form of state intervention (Lally, 2013). Besides 
the banks’ unwillingness to defer coupons on Upper 
T2 hybrids, that could affect their credit history, and 
lack of ability to defer coupons on Lower T2 subor-
dinated debt securities have contributed to the need 
of bail-outs. One may say that tight requirements on 
deferral applicable to Additional T1 hybrid securi-
ties were introduce to prevent this kind of situations. 
Investment Banks that strongly rely on Lower Tier 2 
instruments have merely no tools to convert these secu-
rities to more loss-absorbing ones. This observation be-
came a cornerstone for the new Basel III requirements. 
All the securities eligible for Additional Tier 1 capital 
(that have replaced the Basel II Upper T2) are subject 
to the contingent conversion into common equity. Un-
der Basel III, Tier 2 capital is no longer separated into 
‘Upper’ and ‘Lower’. In fact, Tier 2 securities began 
to die out as Basel III implementation is forced in the 
countries, because fi nancial institutions while trying to 
build up Tier 1 reserves sell off Tier 2 securities. Con-
sequently, the trend in signifi cant reduction of Tier 2 
securities across all countries implementing Basel III, 
not just in Europe and the US, is to be continued (Mc-
Nulty, 2013; Euroweek, 2014) [7, 8].
Last but not least, Tier 3 capital was abandoned 
though the very concept of Tier 3 securities has not 
totally disappeared [4]. Kamil and Marcin Liberadz-
ky in their study of hybrid securities (2016) prove a 
strong market demand to mitigate the uncertainty in-
troduced by the contingent conversion trigger event, 
or ‘regulatory trigger’, defi ned in Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive. The idea of Tier 3 regulatory 
capital is to separate the hybrid securities that may 
provide the solution under Tier 3 from the hybrid se-
curities that are beyond the scope of the solution [3].
IV. ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Capital Requirements Regulation has introduced 
CoCos, among other Additional T1 instruments, to 
legal systems of all EU member states. Important to 
notice that Capital Requirements Regulation contin-
gent conversion/ write-down provisions and ‘bail-in’ 
provisions of the newly introduced Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive do overlap. That brings con-
fusion about conversion mechanisms to the point of 
non-feasibility. When compared to traditional com-
pany law, which is heavily shaped by EU Directives, 
CoCos conversion mechanism may disturb the prin-
ciple shareholders’ pre-emptive right to subscribe to 
new shares issued by a company. Before Capital Re-
quirements Regulation and EU Second Capital Direc-
tive, this right was considered to be essential for the 
corporate structure as a tool to protect shareholders 
against dilution of their rights [15]. Any company’s 
tool that would aim to exclude this right was forbid-
den [6]. Apparently the contingent conversion results 
in dilution of control. This fact raises some regula-
tory concerns: (i) on the relation between pre-emptive 
rights and issuance of CoCos, (ii) whether issuance 
of CoCos has the same consequences as admission to 
trading of shares and conventional convertible bonds 
and, of course, (iii) to what extent the corporate struc-
ture of fi nancial institutions is unique in comparison 
to an ordinary joint-stock company.
V. EVALUATION OF HYBRID SECURITIES
The fi rst to develop a common approach to assess 
the risks of hybrid securities were the rating agencies 
such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Apparently, it was 
due to the need for transparent approach in rating hy-
brid securities. Thus, rating agencies introduced new 
criteria — “equity credit” — for the unifi ed assess-
ment of such securities.
A. EQUITY CREDIT
“Equity Credit” is analytical indicator defining 
the degree to which hybrid security possess equity or 
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debt characteristics adjusted to the level of issuer’s 
risk of capital. Hybrid securities are assessed for their 
likely impact on the fi nancial stability of the issuer 
and senior debt obligations of the issuer in terms of 
financial stress and the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
«Equity credit» is assigned regardless of the issuer’s 
credit rating (source: Fitch).
«Equity credit» refl ects the fi nancial fl exibility of 
the security during fi nancial stress of the issuer. For 
instance, the fl exibility can be provided in the struc-
ture of a hybrid security by allowing the deferral of 
interest payments without the occurrence of the issuer 
default or redemption of the security.
«Equity credit» also depends on the possibility to 
reduce the investor losses in the event of the issuer’s 
bankruptcy or refi nancing, and the extent to which the 
hybrid securities are subordinated to the senior unse-
cured creditors or their equivalents.
Agencies generally assume that the presence of 
deeply subordinated securities in the issuer’s capital 
structure may reduce the risk of the issuer default-
ing on senior debt and increase fi nancial fl exibility. 
The presence of “safety cushion” in the form of con-
vertible debt, the interest payments on which can be 
deferred or avoided in the event of fi nancial stress, 
increases the credibility of the senior lenders to the 
issuer [11].
Classifi cation of hybrid securities based on “eq-
uity credit” criteria is given below:
Equity Classes/Baskets (%) Equity Debt
Class/Basket E — Superior Equity Content 100 0
Class/Basket D — High Equity Content 75 25
Class/Basket C–Moderate Equity Content 50 50
Class/Basket B — Low Equity Content 25 75
Class/Basket A — Debt; No Equity Content 0 100
Figure 2. Equity Credit classifi cation
Sources: Fitch, Moody’s.
In general, the more equity-like is the structure of 
hybrid security the higher the equity credit assigned 
by the rating agencies. Fitch defines a range of five 
classes; Moody’s has fi ve baskets [2, 11]. At one spec-
trum end there is class/basket A, which is 0 % equity 
and 100 % debt; at the other end there is class/basket 
E, which is 100 % equity and 0 % debt. This classifi ca-
tion is important, because hybrids assigned high equity 
credit allow the issuer to raise capital without increas-
ing its leverage. Higher leverage may negatively affect 
a fi rm’s credit rating and increase the interest rates on 
its future debt issuances. By contrast, from a corpo-
rate taxation perspective, it is better for an issuer that 
the instrument is classifi ed as interest-generating debt 
rather than dividend-generating equity. The interest on 
debt capital is tax deductible, while the return on eq-
uity capital is not. Thus, issuers often favor hybrids that 
are half-debt, half-equity (class/basket C). If properly 
structured, such securities may increase equity capital 
component while at the same time generating tax-de-
ductible interest cash fl ows.
If the security is rated D, for example, (hybrid on 
75 % has equity properties and on 25 % debt proper-
ties) its price will be adjusted to the 75 % of equity risk 
and to the 25 % of the company’s credit risk. For debt 
service coverage ratio, however, this classifi cation does 
not apply. Instead, the debt service coverage ratio is 
calculated fi rst for all possible payments, and then only 
for the mandatory payments. To rate the hybrid securi-
ties agencies rely on the following characteristics:
I. LOSS ABSORPTION
Hybrid security structured as a bond can be con-
verted into preferred or common shares in the event 
of losses or payment default. In other cases, subordi-
nated loans can get the priority right for repayment 
in the case of, for example, lowering the rating of the 
company. Hybrid securities may also include the con-
dition of reduction of their nominal value in the case 
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of reduction of underlying assets value. This charac-
teristic is called «loss absorption» since it allows to 
absorb the losses of the company; in some cases, this 
characteristic of the securities may even help compa-
nies to avoid bankruptcy [11]. Moreover, the capital 
buffer hybrids provide can also decrease the credit 
risk associated with senior debt. Holders of senior 
debt will bear a lower risk than before the introduc-
tion of a hybrid into the issuers’ balance sheet [2]. 
This fact is be supported by an increase of the senior 
debt market price right after the issue of hybrids is 
announced to the public and a decrease in the senior 
debt credit spread [2, 3].
I I. CONVERTIBILITY
The conversion can be classifi ed as mandatory or op-
tional. Only securities with mandatory conversion sat-
isfy the agencies’ criteria for the «equity credit». Such 
hybrids are assessed in regards to the shares character-
istics received upon the conversion, the conversion ra-
tio and the time to conversion. In the case of relatively 
short period to conversion, high «equity credit» will be 
assigned; in the case when conversion is dependent on 
certain event, «equity credit» will be reduced.
I I I. DEFERRAL OF INTEREST 
PAYMENTS
An important feature of non-convertible mezza-
nine instruments is the ability to delay or avoid pay-
ments during the period of fi nancial stress. So-called 
«coupon deferral mechanisms» and «alternative cou-
pon settlement mechanisms» are structured specifi -
cally for this purpose. For instance, preferred shares 
without obligation on dividend payments have the 
greatest fl exibility for deferral. This would lead to an 
increase in “equity credit”.
IV. ADDITIONAL STEP-UP 
INTEREST RATE
Additional incremental increase in interest rate is 
considered by rating agencies as a reduction in the 
fl exibility of issuer’s obligations. This feature usually 
lowers «equity credit» for one class in the ranking.
V. COVENANTS
Some mezzanine instruments (convertible into 
shares) include covenants, for example, prohibiting 
the issue of additional company bonds for the purpose 
of shares redemption. As a rule, it does not affect the 
rating of these securities.
VI. EFFECTIVE MATURITY DATE
A common feature of hybrid securities with a long 
maturity, or perpetual, is to have a call option. The 
option does not imply any contractual obligations 
to execute it in a certain period and, consequently, 
makes it possible in periods of fi nancial instability to 
avoid refi nancing risk for the issuer, i.e. to take the 
advantage of unlimited funding. Nevertheless, the 
presence of certain characteristics, such as a step-up 
interest rate, can exert excessive pressure on the is-
suer and motivate him to exercise the option and to 
refi nance the loan even at the time of fi nancial stress. 
Moreover, quite often, the price of hybrid securities at 
the issue already incorporates the «call» option future 
execution; thereby issuers commit themselves to its 
implementation. As a rule, this leads to a reduction of 
«equity credit» when assigning a rating to the hybrid 
securities.
VII. CHANGE OF CONTROL 
AND «PUT» RIGHT
The issuer may have the right to implement the 
«call» option in the case of control change in the 
company, such as the case of divestiture. If the issuer 
does not implement the option, then the interest rate 
of hybrid security may significantly increase. The 
logic of this condition is linked to protection of inves-
tors’ rights from the disadvantage position in the case 
of divestiture. If the hybrid security enables the inves-
tor to realize the «put» option or possess an obliga-
tion of the issuer to repay it in the case of company’s 
divestiture, the rating agencies will lower the «equity 
credit».
VIII. ADDITIONAL INVESTORS’ 
«PROTECTION»
Some hybrid securities include special covenants 
or special conditions in order to protect the interests 
of investors, what in some cases; can lead to bank-
ruptcy of the issuer, if he does not fulfi ll these condi-
tions. Hybrid securities may receive the «equity cred-
it» only if there is no more than 2–3 such covenants 
or conditions.
Apparently, the size of “equity credit” depends on 
the structure of each hybrid security and their evalua-
tion remains highly subjective. Moreover, assignment 
of «equity credit» may be affected by differences in 
legal regulation of stock exchanges in different coun-
tries, in particular, in the execution and interpretation 
of the contractual obligations of the issuer. For exam-
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ple, in some countries regulatory authorities may for-
bid the issuer to redeem the securities before the of-
fi cial redemption date, if such option is not provided 
for at the time of issuance of hybrid securities. Thus, 
the degree of «equity credit» assigned to hybrid secu-
rities may also vary from country to country.
B. COMPONENTS OF RISK: CASE STUDY
This section describes the analytical considera-
tions arising from a common approach and method-
ology proposed by the rating agencies. Based on the 
methodology for assessing the hybrid securities, it is 
logical to assume that the price change of hybrid se-
curities (say convertible bonds — ΔC) will be corre-
lated with the stock price change (ΔS) and the corpo-
rate bond price change (ΔB) of the same issuer. Let’s 
test the hypothesis on Capitaland mandatory convert-
ible bonds and see how changes in stock prices and 
the corporate bonds prices actually explain the change 
in the price of convertible bonds. Characteristics of 
convertible bond is shown in Figure 3.
Thus, distribution of the convertible bond price 
change can be defined as leptokurtic. Volatility of 
price change is higher for the stock than for the con-
vertible bond as can be concluded from Figure 4.
In the case of a linear relation between ΔС and ΔS 
we expect that ΔC varies as changes ΔS, and call it a 
variation, which can be explained by the regression. 
The residual variation must be as small as possible. If 
so, most of the variation ΔC will be explained by ΔS 
regression, the points will lie close to the regression 
line, i.e. line will fi t the data well.
The regression results are presented in Figures 5–6. 
The proportion of the total variance ΔC, which is ex-
plained by the regression is called determination co-
effi cient and is usually expressed as a percentage and 
denoted R2 (in simple linear regression is the value r2, 
the square of the correlation coeffi cient). It allows the 
analyst to assess the quality of the regression. As we 
can see below, the change in stock price explains only 
41 % of the change in the price of a convertible bond, 
and the change in bond prices even less, only 3 %.
Difference (100-R2) is the percentage of variance 
that cannot be explained by the regression. In other 
words, 56 % of the price change of the convertible 
bonds is not explained by the change in share prices 
or/and the change in bond prices. In this case, the cri-
teria for the regression coeffi cient ΔC confi rms that 
ΔC is strongly associated with ΔS (p <001).
This case study shows that attaching the price 
as well as the risk of mandatory convertibles to the 
price/risk of stocks and bonds is far from ideal. The 
determination coeffi cient confi rms that there are other 
factors (or a combination of factors), which must also 
be taken into account when evaluating hybrid securi-
ties. Equity risk is certainly not the only important 
factor. Moreover, Figure 10 shows some interesting 
movement of the convertible bond price that deserve 
our attention. For example, in the period from No-
vember to December 2014, despite the rise in stock 
and bond prices, the price of the convertible bond 
was declining. Moreover, as shown in Figure 10, the 
volatility of convertible bonds is actually lower than 
the volatility of both stocks and corporate bonds, al-
though, according to the theory, the volatility should 
be somewhere in between. In order to study these 
phenomena it is necessary to construct a more accu-
rate model for assessing hybrid securities.
Figure 3. Characteristics of mandatory convertible bonds issued by CapitaLand
Mandatory convertible issued by CAPITALAND, June 19, 2013
ISIN XS0935605401 SEDOL B9YRS72
ISSUE DATE 19.06.2013 ISSUE PRICE 100
ISSUE SIZE 650 000 000 RANKING Class D (75 % Equity component) 
COUPON TYPE Fixed: Plain Vanilla Fixed Coupon MATURITY 19.06.2020
OPTION Convertible, Special Call MARKET OF ISSUE United States
CURRENCY SGD COUNTRY OF RISK Singapore (SG) 
COUPON 1,85 FREQUENCY Semiannually
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Figure 4. Comparing distributions of changes in prices of convertible bond (∆С) 
and equity (∆S) of Capitaland 2013–2016
Data Source: Thompson Reuters.
Regression statistics 
(∆C, ∆S) 
Multiple R 0,642
R-square 0,413
Normal 
R-square
0,412
Standard error 0,010
Observations 619
Dispersion 
analysis
df SS MS F Signifi cance F
Regression 1 0,0396 0,0396 433,3954 0,0000
Residue 617 0,0564 0,0001
Total 618 0,0961
Coeffi cient
Standard 
error
t-statistics P-signifi cance
Lower
95 %
Upper95 % Lower 95,0 %
Upper 
95,0 %
Y-intersection 0,0002 0,0004 0,4198 0,6748 –0,0006 0,0009 –0,0006 0,0009
∆C 2,3680 0,1137 20,8182 0,0000 2,1446 2,5913 2,1446 2,5913
Figure 5. Regression output (∆С; ∆S)
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C. CONVERSION MECHANISM MATTERS
At first glance convertible bonds (CB), reverse 
convertible bonds (RC) and contingent convertible 
bonds (CoCo) are quite similar hybrid securities: their 
structure is based on a straight fi xed coupon bond and 
all of them possess equity conversion mechanism. Let 
us ignore at the moment effective maturity, coupon 
deferral and bond call/put options and solely focus on 
Regression statistics (∆C, ∆B) 
Multiple R 0,1640
R-square 0,0269
Normal 
R-square
–0,0055
Standard error 0,0915
Dispersion 
analysis
df SS MS F
Signifi cance 
F
Regression 1 0,0069 0,0069 0,8294 0,3697
Residue 30 0,2509 0,0084
Total 31 0,2578
Coeffi cient
Standard 
error
t-statistics P-signifi cance
Lower 
95 %
Upper 
95 %
Lower 
95,0 %
Upper 
95,0 %
Y-пересечение –0,0079 0,0162 –0,4878 0,6292 –0,0409 0,0251 –0,0409 0,0251
∆C –0,7025 0,7714 –0,9107 0,3697 –2,2780 0,8729 –2,2780 0,8729
Figure 6. Regression output (∆С; ∆B)
Figure 7. Price change of mandatory convertible bond ∆С versus price change of underlying shares ∆S
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the impact of various conversion mechanisms of CB, 
RC and CoCo.
A convertible bondholder is entitled, at cer-
tain dates, to choose between converting into a 
fi xed number of issuer’s shares and not converting, 
thus, to continue receiving CB coupons and prin-
cipal. While the CB investor holds a portfolio of 
a straight bullet bond and a long call stock option. 
Figure 8. Price volatility of mandatory convertible bonds (∆С), shares (∆S)
and corporate bonds (∆B) of CapitaLand
Figure 9. Trend line of price changes of convertible bonds (∆С) and shares (∆S) of CapitaLand 2013–2016. 
Data Source: Thompson Reuters Eikon
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The option strike price is equal to future convert-
ible bond value divided by the number of shares re-
ceived at conversion [14]. Therefore the CB holder 
has a limited loss potential to straight bond value 
(called investment value), and an unlimited profit 
potential when the underlying shares price rises 
(Figure 10). The loss cap may be one of the factors 
explaining low volatility of CapitaLand mandatory 
convertible in Figure 8.
Yet the CoCo conversion is triggered automati-
cally when the issuer’s regulatory capital ratio drops 
below a specifi ed level, thus, the bondholder receives 
a predetermined number of issuer’s shares and the 
bond disappears. The share price drop of say below 
a level of S1 would accompany the distress scenario. 
Therefore, the CoCo holder has a position equivalent 
to holding a straight bond and short put stock option. 
As a result, the CoCo value range is capped by the 
straight bond value and is backed by zero (Figure 
13), with strong sensitivity to underlying stock price 
downturn. In fact, a reverse convertible bond has a 
very similar conversion mechanism to CoCo. RC 
pays off interest and principal unless the underlying 
share price (or pool of selected stocks value) drops 
below a specified strike level at bonds maturity. If 
so, the RC bondholder receives payoff of an amount 
equivalent to the underlying shares depreciated value. 
As a result, the RC value versus the price of the un-
derlying shares is practically identical to the one of 
the CoCo (Figure 11).
Thus, while convertible bond offers investors the 
safety of fi xed income security during distress periods 
and profi tability of equity at prosperous times, Co-
Figure 10. Theoretical value of a convertible bond 
(CB) versus the price of the underlying share 
Source: Kamil and Marcin Liberadzki (2015).
Cos and RCs are high-risk investments because of the 
short put option embedded. Therefore, the risk has to 
correspond to a higher coupon. There is a danger for 
the investors attracted by high CoCos’ yields for the 
risk underestimation. A violent underlying stock price 
may rapidly reduce CoCo’s value to zero [12, 13]. 
These problems of the market performance of CoCos 
and their ability to absorb loss are crucial when as-
sessing the capital requirements of Basel III. Howev-
er, there is still a lack of structural methods to assess 
the risk of Coco’s precisely [17]. Moreover, another 
important issue is contagion risk incorporated in hy-
brid securities. A hard lesson from the most recent fi -
nancial crisis is that innovative fi nancial instruments 
do not eliminate risk, but rather transfer it elsewhere. 
The complexity and interconnectedness of the credit 
derivatives market has made this transfer a dangerous 
channel of transmitting price shocks to markets that 
had been considered to be diversifi ed [16]. This calls 
for the assessment of Coco’s ability to transfer risk 
and regulatory measures able to identify and control 
the degree of risk transferability of such innovative 
securities.
The family of hybrid securities is still growing, 
reinforced by fi nancial engineering of market partici-
pants and — interestingly — regulators. Neverthe-
less, there is still a room for innovation in both the 
design of hybrid securities and regulation of fi nancial 
markets. One the most discussed issue remains the 
ability to properly assess and manage the risks incor-
CB value 
P=Stock price/Conversion 
ratio 
Investment value (Bond floor) 
Underlying stock price 
Bond ceiling 
CoCo value 
P=Stock price/Conversion 
ratio 
    S1           Underlying stock price 
Figure 11. Theoretical value of a contingent 
convertible (CoCo) versus the price 
of the underlying share 
Source: Kamil and Marcin Liberadzki (2015).
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porated in hybrids for both state and market partici-
pants.
VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up, mezzanine capital combine features 
of both debt and equity. This description reflects 
the character of fi nancial instruments in the Basel 
II Capital Accord, but is not designed to meet the 
requirements of Additional Tier 1 capital under the 
Basel III. Further studies and observations of hy-
brids’ performance are crucial for assessment of 
these securities. One of the key analytical consid-
eration arising from feasibility study is to what ex-
tent the corporate structure of fi nancial institutions 
is unique in comparison to an ordinary joint-stock 
company. Low yields elsewhere encourage new in-
vestors to buy hybrids; it was the same with CDOs 
a decade ago. Then the question arises as to whether 
all investors are able to properly assess or manage 
the risks involved and to whether the rating agen-
cies can properly assess the risks while rating such 
securities. Uncertain loss-absorption hierarchy and 
complex conversion or coupon cancelation mecha-
nisms may pose a risk beyond individuals’ assess-
ment capabilities. This issue remains of particular 
importance to both public and private participants.
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